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ABSTRACT

Four articles on changing governance patterns of state colleges and universities are presented. In "State Control vs. Campus Autonomy: A Struggle for Balance," Donald E. Walters discusses the distribution of power in Illinois' "system of systems" governance structure. In Illinois several multi-campus university systems coexist; each is controlled by a separate governing board and is subject, to a greater or lesser extent, to the jurisdiction of a statewide board charged with coordination. In "Minimizing the Loss of Campus Autonomy," Harold Delaney considers factors that influence the magnitude of the loss of freedom or autonomy from statewide coordination and, at the same time, factors that affect the compensation for that loss. In "Colorado Consortium of State Colleges: Sharing Authority and Responsibility," John A. Marvel discusses a new form of governance premised on a procedure that begins with the involvement of the faculties and administrators of all the colleges. The four institutions of the consortium are described, and outcomes of consortium governance are reviewed. In "Restrictive Aspects of Centralized Governance," Albert N. Whiting discusses centralized governance of higher education in relation to the quality of education provided. Difficulties faced by administrators of colleges (chancellors and/or presidents) operating under centralized governance systems are considered. (SW)

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Views on System Governance

Harold Delaney
John A. Marvel
Donald E. Walters
Albert N. Whiting

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Foreword

During the past two decades, the governance structure of state colleges and universities was altered visibly. Institutions that had operated by and large in singular spheres of authority and influence became part of larger and more centralized governance constellations. At a national level, it is nevertheless difficult to generalize the degree to which institutions, and in many cases their local boards of trustees, now share the authority for decision-making with administrators and boards of larger systems. Nor can the impact of the governance patterns be gauged generally and simply.

One generalization can be made with some surety: the new forms of governance are part of the evolving change in higher education and will not be reversed. Evaluating the new systems through comparisons with the past forms has only limited value. The strengths and weaknesses, benefits and costs of governance systems must be examined in the contemporary context: the organizational and leadership needs of colleges and universities as dictated by the availability of resources, changing enrollment patterns, the demands of public accountability, and the need for continuous program development, among other important factors.

A number of system arrangements are represented in the AASCU membership, each certainly with its proponents to recommend advantages and its critics to point out shortcomings. It is not the purpose of this publication to recommend or to criticize a particular governance pattern; the views expressed are the authors' and not to be attributed to AASCU.

Views on System Governance is published to stimulate discussion and consideration, with the perspective in the present. It is hoped that through such an on-going and open evaluation of what systems are operating, of what works where and when, and of what might be made better, governance patterns will continue to evolve in a manner that reinforces the educational objectives of public institutions.

State Control vs. Campus Autonomy: A Struggle for Balance

Donald E. Walters

As public higher education became big business in the 1960's, state legislatures across the country responded by expanding the organizational structures for control and accountability. Most of these new structures were created to regulate (though not necessarily to restrain) the explosive growth of colleges and universities during that era. The intent was to provide the executive and legislative branches with a clearer understanding of, and a firmer grasp on, the increasingly complex budget allocation decisions required by post-secondary education.

A not uncommon response of states during the recent past (as for example in Connecticut in 1965, and in Virginia in 1967) was simply to add on top of an existing organization of colleges and universities a new statewide coordinating agency. Typically, such agencies were given responsibility for centralized budget review, academic program approval, and comprehensive planning.

Other states (notably Maine in 1968, Wisconsin in 1971 and North Carolina in 1972) created a functional nexus between coordination and governance by merging all of the state's separate four-year institutions (and occasionally two-year campuses) into a single new university or university system controlled at the top by a lay board of trustees, regents, or governors.

Still a third type of state response was to create (or further strengthen) several co-existing multi-campus university systems, each controlled by a separate governing board and each subject—to a greater or lesser extent—to the jurisdiction of a statewide board or council charged with coordination. Such was the experience in California, Massachusetts, and Illinois.

After experimenting with various forms of statewide coordination during the 1960's, many states began in the early 1970's to subject their post-secondary institutions to still further scrutiny and control by expanding the higher education wing in the state budget office, by strengthening the staff within auditing agencies, and by significantly increasing the number and quality of analysts working for house and state committees.It is not surprising, therefore, that so many universities today perceive institutional autonomy as seriously threatened by an increasingly inquisitive state bureaucracy.

It must be admitted, however, that every state has a vital interest in assuring itself and the public it represents that scarce tax dollars are being allocated to higher education in accordance with clearly understood and pre-approved goals and priorities. Indeed, once this legislative responsibility is accepted as constitutionally self-evident, it may be possible to discuss the one question that truly can

Donald E. Walters is executive director of the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities in Illinois

be negotiated: How can a fair balance be created between the state's interest in fiscal control and higher education's interest in institutional autonomy?

Such a balance depends significantly upon the nature of the organizational framework a state constructs for higher education. The organizational relationships linking the higher education community to the state (namely, the relationship of campus to lay board, of lay board to system board, of system board to statewide coordinating board, and the whole of this structure to the legislature and the Governor) is a key to determining whether the tensions between the state house and the campus can be maintained at an acceptable level.

To keep the tension within a creative range Illinois has constructed an organizational arrangement for its community colleges and universities known as the "System of Systems." Indeed, the effectiveness of this complex organizational approach may result precisely from its ability to prevent "too much" control by the state or "too much" freedom for the university. As a sensitive balancing mechanism capable of avoiding the excesses of either such extreme, the Illinois System of Systems is an important organizational model.

The Governance Structure of Higher Education in Illinois: The 1960's

Illinois entered the 1960's with eight four-year institutions and a scattering of junior colleges, many under the control of local school boards The four-year institutions consisted of the University of Illinois with a main campus in Urbana-Champaign, and a medical center and an undergraduate program in Chicago, all under the control of the University of Illinois Board of Trusttees; Southern Illinois University (SIU) with its only campus at Carbondale but with centers in East St. Louis and Alton, all under the control of the SIU Board of Trustees; Eastern Illinois University, Western Illinois University, Illinois State Normal University, and Northern Illinois University, all under the jurisdiction of the State Teachers College Board; and Chicago Teachers College (with two campuses, one on the north side and the other on the south side of Chicago), controlled by the City of Chicago Board of Education. Moreover, there were several state junior colleges, each with its own board, as well as several junior colleges controlled by local school boards.

In 1961, at the urging of Governor Otto Kerner, the General Assembly enacted legislation that created the Illinois Board of Higher Education (BHE), a new statewide coordinating agency for all of post-secondary education. By statute, the BHE is mandated to advise the legislature and the Governor on higher education matters, and is specifically charged with responsibility for the review of all higher education budgets, the approval of new or expanded academic programs, and for statewide master planning. Since 1961, the BHE has adopted four separate master planning documents.

It is of interest that essentially all of the major growth and reorganization of higher education in Illinois in the past 14 years has been the direct result of recommendations by the Board of Higher Education. In the first phase of its Master Plan, adopted in 1964, the BHE recommended, and the General Assembly approved:

- The development of a new statewide system of community colleges which now consists of 51 two-year institutions in 39 community college districts. Each community college is funded in part by the State and in part by its district and each is under the control of its own local board. All 51 community colleges, however, are coordinated by a separate statewide agency called the Illinois Community College Board, as well as by the BHE.

- The creation of a new board to govern the junior colleges in the City of Chicago.

- The transfer of the two-campus Chicago Teachers College to the State Teachers College Board (whose named was changed in 1965 to the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities).

- The development ot two new commuter universities in Chicago and the East St. Louis region which soon became the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois and the Edwardsville Campus of Southern Illinois University, respectively.

In the second phase of its master plan, adopted by the BHE in 1966, recommendations were made for the creation of an additional governing board, the Board of Regents, to which Illinois State University and Northern Illinois University eventually were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities. In addition, key proposals were made for the development of two brand new "capstone" institutions designed as commuter schools to offer work only at the junior and senior year and the master's degree level. Again the General Assembly accepted the proposals of the BHE. Sangamon State University was opened in Springfield in the fall of 1970 as the third institution under the control of the Board of Regents (along with Illinois State University and Northern Illinois University), and Governors State University opened in the fall of 1971 just south of Chicago as the fifth university under the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors (along with Chicago State College and Northeastern Illinois State College, which also were designated universities in 1971; and Western Illinois University and Eastern Illinois University, which had been given university status in 1957).

The 1970's and the Emergence of the "System of Systems"

By the end of the 1960's the Illinois Higher Education Community was left with an interesting and neatly balanced organizational structure whose size (14

universities and professional schools, and 51 community colleges), whose geographical distribution (a two- or four-year campus within reach of every region and major population area in the state), and whose diversity of educational mission and program offering, assured access for every qualified citizen of the State.

Hence, there now exists in Illinois the following five separate but coordinated clusters of post-secondary institutions which make up the System of Systems:

- The University of Illinois System consists of a single governing board of nine trustees, each elected in statewide elections for a six-year term. The Board has total governing responsibility for the University's Urbana-Champaign campus, its Chicago Circle Campus, and its Chicago medical school, as well as its several medical centers located around the State. Each campus is administered by a chancellor responsible to the President of the University who is also the University's "system head".

- The Board of Governors System consists of a lay governing board of nine members appointed by the governor for six-year terms. The Board is responsible for the governance of five universities: Chicago State University, Eastern Illinois University, Governors State University, Northeastern Illinois University, and Western Illinois University. The responsibility to manage each campus is delegated to the president. The system head is the Board's executive director, charged with systemwide coordination and direction in such areas as budgets, academic programs, legal services, collective bargaining, and legislative relations.

- The Southern Illinois University System consists of a governing board of seven trustees, each appointed by the Governor for a six-year term. The Board has jurisdiction over a three-campus university with locations at Carbondale, Edwardsville, and a medical school in Springfield. The system head is the general secretary of the Board, responsible for coordination of systemwide matters while the management of each institution is delegated to the respective campus president.

- The Board of Regents System consists of a lay governing board of nine members appointed by the Governor

for six-year terms. The Board is responsible for governing three separate institutions: Illinois State University in Normal, Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, and Sangamon State University in Springfield. The management of each campus is delegated to a president. The system head is the Board's executive director who has responsibility for systemwide coordination and direction in such key areas as budget, academic programs, and legislative relations.

- The Community College System consists of the statewide Illinois Community College Board responsible for coordinating the affairs of the 51 community college campuses; and the individual lay boards charged with the governance of each separate community college. The statewide Board has nine members appointed by the Governor for six-year terms. Each institution is managed by a president. The system head is the executive director of the statewide Community College Board.

Although the Board of Higher Education is responsible only for coordination and not for the governance of the colleges and universities, it is nevertheless the capstone of the System of Systems. Budget coordination for the entire Illinois higher education community and final approval for academic program requests both rest with the board. Moreover, the on-going statewide planning activities of the new BHE draw continual attention to the fact that it is the organizational locus for key statewide decision-making affecting the Illinois colleges and universities.

The System of Systems: The Distribution of Power

From a practical point of view, the notion of power in higher education is often thought of as the ability of one individual, board, or agency to make decisions that affect or control another. So defined, power is made to appear antithetical to autonomy, to the ability of that "other" to make free choices. For this reason individual institutions feel "pushed around" by statewide boards and other agencies that have the power to direct or dictate. But autonomy also exists in voluntarily adhering to the decisions of others because they are judged to be neither unfair nor unreasonable. An organizational arrangement like the System of Systems in Illinois is based explicitly upon a distribution of power between board and campus; between president and system head; and between system head and the executive director of the Board of Higher Education. It is precisely the assignment of power to the BHE to make some decisions, to the governing boards and their staff to make others, and to the presidents, faculty, students and campus

staff to make still others, that is the strength of this delicately balanced structure. An assertion that the "power" exercised by a statewide coordinating board (or system board, system head, or campus president) is necessarily inimical to the autonomy of another is only true when the pattern of decisions made by such boards or individuals, taken together and over time, is unreasonable and unfair; and where those affected by the decisions have not had a chance to participate in their formulation. In short, autonomy is hindered when the principles that make any democratic system work are violated consistently. Conversely, when these principles are respected, it should be possible to keep the organizational tensions between the statewide board and the system boards and their institutions within a reasonable and creative balance. To the extent that such tensions are kept in balance, institutions do in fact enjoy significant autonomy.

A Check and Balance for the State

If the System of Systems structure protects the autonomy of the Illinois senior institutions and the community colleges by keeping the "power to dictate" and the "freedom to choose" in reasonable balance, how does the State benefit from this arrangement?

The constitutional responsibilities of the legislatures and governors of most states, as well as the requirements of practical politics, force governors and legislators alike to focus their higher education concerns on two main functions: the budget and appropriation function and the planning and goal setting function. In Illinois both of these functions are managed more effectively in the legislative and executive branches precisely because of the checks and balances achieved by the System of Systems. There are three reasons why this protects the interests of the state.

First, every campus request for growth that reaches the General Assembly has to pass three rigorous tests: one by the institutional president, one by the president's own system head and governing board, and one by the BHE and its staff. The tight interplay of advocacy and devil's advocacy that takes place within this review process makes it very difficult for any proposal to reach the legislature unless it has demonstrable merit. Thus, the series of examinations required within the System of Systems with respect to budgets and program requests creates a set of checks and balances that finally subjects all higher education recommendations to more open scrutiny and evaluation than was possible before.

Second, through cooperation between the BHE and each university system, a pre-agreed coordinated budget request has been submitted to the General Assembly in recent legislative sessions. Thus, the system proposals of the University of Illinois, the Board of Governors, Southern Illinois University, and the Board of Regents, by prior mutual consent, all have contained comparable requests for such basic budget units as faculty and staff salary increases, utility increases, and increases to meet inflation. The result of such voluntary coordination has been that the Illinois legislature has not had to referee incessant political fights in committee or on the floor of the House and Senate, which end with the university

system with the most political clout—though not necessarily with the greatest need—walking off with a disproportionate share of the support available to higher education. The orderly approach to the appropriation process recently achieved in Illinois benefits both the universities and the state government and tends to add credibility to the process developed by the System of Systems.

Third, over the past 14 years the planning documents developed within the System of Systems have become a set of extraordinary decision-making tools in the hands of legislators. There have been four separate statewide Master Plans adopted by the BHE (in 1964, 1966, 1971, and 1976) as well as a variety of short- and long-range planning statements by the four university systems and their individual institutions. These documents, and the studies continually undertaken to keep them updated, set forth the mission and goal of each university and provide a constant flow of information related to the accomplishments of these goals. This includes data on every important aspect of the campuses' functions and operations—from enrollment to placement, from faculty productivity to instructional costs, from space utilization to new student markets. These studies, and the comprehensive planning documents which they update, become for the members of the General Assembly and the Governor a starting place for reaching their own decisions about the funding priority to be assigned higher education within the total State budget.

Critique

Whether the Illinois System of Systems has proven to be an effective solution to one state's complex organizational problem will no doubt continue to be debated. Nevertheless, in recent years this unique structure has provided some compelling evidence that it has both the strength and flexibility to maintain that precarious balance between autonomy and accountability in higher education.

The Illinois approach is a model that plainly deserves continuing study by students of organization and governance. It is, however, only one of several attempts to use structure to regulate a state's relationship with its universities. Around the country there are arrangements in which each campus is governed by its own separate lay board (with or without an intervening statewide coordinating board), or in which all campuses are merged into a single university, or university system, with a single super board, and shades of compromises in between.

Whatever is sought, however, one hopes that the state organizational planners of the 1980's will be sensitive to the universal demands created by any governmental partnership that hopes to endure; namely openness to the other's legitimate needs, respect for the other's reasonable privacy, and patience with the other's honest failures. While such virtues may not be wholly achieved in the partnership between campus and capitol, they surely remain ardently desired ideals.

Minimizing the Loss of Campus Autonomy

Harold Delaney

Higher education today is an integral and critical element of our society. Its critical and integral character is evident whether we are concerned with manpower needs or with just living in a society made awesomely complex by much of what has been derived from higher education. Herein lies the germinating seed from which has sprouted the spiraling demand for and on higher education. Not only has the spiral ascended to a very high level in response to the numbers of people seeking higher education, but it also has widened into a very broad band in response to the increased variety of programs that are being demanded.

This kind of multidimensional and multifaceted growth calls for massive nourishment. As with providing food for the population in the modern world, delivery of sustenance to higher education requires today an advanced technology as well as a clearer understanding of whether what we are supplying is not only good, but also good for us. The heightened attention that is being and must be directed to this bilateral requirement underlies the thrust toward statewide coordination and systems.

In this context technology does not refer to the limited "educational technology" that is a part of our common parlance. Rather it conveys finding, measuring, maintaining, and conserving the resources essential to sustaining higher education today—individually sophisticated activities with intricate interaction. This complexity increasingly demands a technical know-how analogous to technologies associated with other kinds of resources in our society, such as food and fuel. Although the analogy can be carried too far, the important parallel is the complexity of problems whose solutions cannot be left to pure chance or to trial and error diffused among unrelated efforts.

In recent years there has been practically no tradition of higher education that has escaped challenge. Some traditions, such as small class size, low student to faculty ratio, prescribed curricula, and academic tenure, have been so thoroughly ingrained that their inherent worth has been taken for granted. Yet all of them have been critized as having only limited value, at best. The criticism has gained credibility as reports of researchers fail to reveal any strong connections between traditional concepts and practices and the quality of educational outcomes. We are becoming increasingly aware that the historic sense of what is good in higher education may be related only minimally to what is fundamentally good for higher education. Seeking clarification of the distinction is as essential as the technology in providing massive nourishment to higher education.

Harold Delaney is executive vice president of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities

Based on a paper presented at The National Conference on Higher Education, sponsored by the American Association of Higher Education, Chicago, Illinois, 1972.

A major quandary facing higher education is a consequence of the new technical demand and the concomitant loss of campus autonomy generated by statewide coordination responding to the demand. Criticism of statewide coordination has been directed principally at the loss of campus autonomy. A proper analysis of that quandary, however, requires inquiry about both the implementation of and the campus response to statewide coordination. The context within which the inquiry should be made can be gleaned from what appears to be an inherent characteristic of nature: when some segment of nature is identifiable as a "system," contrived or spontaneous in its formation, some degrees of freedom become fixed. More simplistically, the creation of an identifiable system seems to involve an inevitable loss of freedom.

Such is the case following the creation of any statewide system of higher education. The inference to be drawn is that in such systems the decrease in freedom of the academic units will be real. That loss of freedom can be minimized, however; and increased perception of how to make maximum use of the remaining freedoms can compensate for the loss.

The question which logically follows is: Are there factors which influence the magnitude of the loss of freedom or autonomy and, at the same time, affect the compensation for that loss? The question can be answered in the affirmative; and three factors will be discussed here.

One important factor is the degree to which members of central staff are "campus oriented but not campus inhibited."* It is increasingly apparent that the heart of the criticism of statewide systems is the lack of sensitivity to the needs and concerns of the individual campuses. Any creative, energetic, and responsible president or chancellor deserves to be assured that someone in the central staff will continue to speak forcefully for the campus when she or he is not present.

There may be at least three practices in central administrations which serve to undermine seriously the confidence of a campus' chief administrator. The first is to talk about the need for diversity among the member institutions while insisting upon a single set of criteria as a measure of institutional quality. The second is the failure to identify some specific individual on the central staff who has the responsibility of being the on-site spokesman and resource for a particular campus in the absence of the president or chancellor. Such an assignment would require that the individual so assigned have a fairly detailed knowledge about the particular campus. The third practice is to contact individuals on the campus without the knowledge of the president or chancellor. Such contacts by the central staff create more than an irritation over "protocol." There is genuine apprehension that the recurring practice can undermine the authority and responsibility of campus chief administrators. In view of the gravity with which this practice is viewed by campuses, it would seem advisable to prohibit it as a matter of official policy.

The descriptions of the three practices which tend to lead to campus alienation imply corrective steps. However, a central administration is obliged not to be

*I am indebted to J. Lawrence Murray who utilized this expression when he was Vice Chancellor for Administration of the State University of New York.

unduly inhibited by a positive orientation to each campus within the system. The exigencies of our times require overcoming the academic provincialism of campus-bound thinking. State legislators who must face the political realities of tax-payers' concerns have a legitimate expectation that higher education is responsive to the community-at-large. The quality of that responsiveness is not enhanced by disjoined efforts. For that reason, if for no other, statewide systems have a vital role to play.

The preceding discussion in essence confirms the loss of campus autonomy and describes accompanying practices which exacerbate the sense of loss of freedom. Correcting those practices will not alone assure that campuses will respond to the system in ways which maximize remaining freedoms. Thus a second factor seems to affect campus autonomy. The factor is the clarity of insight which campuses have into the nature of what each campus may have lost. Part of the clarity depends on answers to the following questions: Is the loss of autonomy perceived and judged in terms which are (or were) appropriate for private-independent institutions? Is it not inherently discriminatory for a state to provide extensive support to one or two of its campuses while leaving others to fend for themselves in the scramble for the remaining resources? Are not there autonomous features newly released and generated by the creation of a system? Does not the strength of organized, collective action demonstrate the limited value of some freedoms which are perceived to be lost?

It may indeed be necessary to conclude that certain aspect of institutional autonomy that historically have characterized private-independent institutions no longer can be justified in either the public or private sector. Wasteful duplication is equally serious in both sectors. Where such waste is apparent, an equitable allocation of resources is called for. Such allocation is likely to meet insurmountable odds without restrictive guidelines. The test of merit then does not rest on the absence or presence of the guidelines, but upon their fair development and administration.

Sometime the notion is voiced that coordination leads to a levelling effect on all institutions within a given system. An overly simplistic approach to "formula funding" ultimately might result in such an outcome. At the same time, when the quality of educational experience of some segment of a state's citizenry is drastically curtailed, reduced, or limited as a consequence of improperly extended campus autonomy, the adversely affected citizens may validly claim unfair and unjust treatment. Any institution which seeks to remedy the adversity will need assistance in a manner that raises its quality, but does not lower that of another.

Included in the questions above are challenges to campuses to look for degrees of freedom which were hidden either prior to coordination or by its emergence. For example, campus planning for the reasonably distant future requires a substantial amount of information gathering. In today's higher educational world the information gathering is very burdensome and in many instances overwhelming for a single campus. The strength and capacity to gather such information is greatly enhanced in the central office of a statewide system. With the burden of information gathering being shouldered elsewhere, a campus gains a new and better opportunity to devote attention to meeting future educational challenges.

Although the example above may seem trivial, the point remains the same. Campuses can and must look for a style of freedom that is predicated on a modern, complex social structure.

The third factor, a critical one, is the executive head of a coordinated system. Two traits seem to be necessary. The first is that the individual must be an educator in the best sense of the word. The executive head must understand the special and fundamental role of faculty. Failure to recognize the special dedication that the overwhelming majority of faculty have to the integrity of their academic disciplines can be the source of irritation and an unfortunate misinterpretation of faculty attitudes. This awareness of faculty role and attitudes must be accompanied by support of high quality teaching and research, both of which must be present in most institutions but not necessarily found simultaneously in individual faculty members.

The second essential trait is having political sensitivity and knowledge of the state. While retaining a true sense of the educator, the executive head must be prepared to understand the role that higher education plays within the political structure of the state. In part this means having as full an understanding as possible of the special political tests which every elected official faces. Although academicians may regard this reality with some disdain, the executive head of a statewide system cannot. The greater the degree to which the administrator personifies an effective integration of the roles of educator and political realist, the greater will be the compensation for loss of institutional autonomy. In fact, the greater the integration of roles, the lesser the liklihood that autonomy will be reduced drastically by more direct control of higher education by legislatures and governors.

Statewide coordination is a response to demanding times. Contrary to some recently expressed views, the response cannot be effected by a return to a "laissez-faire" status. However, experience already has demonstrated that coordination can be weakened and misdirected if central staffs fail to have sufficient campus orientation. At the same time, campuses must ask themselves different questions about their response to a coordinated system that is "campus oriented, but not campus inhibited."

Colorado Consortium of State Colleges: Sharing Authority and Responsibility

John A. Marvel

The sixties ushered in a rapid growth in higher education that was accompanied by a variety of new structures in institutional arrangements. Regardless of the form of alignments, the rationale was stronger for centralized authority to provide direction and public accountability. More often than not, the higher education community joined as architectural partners in the design and implementation of centralized systems.

Current operations of many of the systems bear little resemblance to the original blueprints or expectations. In far too many instances, as centralized systems were put into place, it became apparent that the structure was more for control than stimulation. Centralized authority tended to look to itself for direction rather than engaging in reciprocal relationships with institutions that were its *raison d'etre*. Leveling of enrollments and tightening of resources have intensified the move to greater centralization for the purpose of restricting and reducing institutional programs and services. Following more than a decade of strengthened centralized authority, higher education governing boards and administrators are disenchanted with the experience.

Debate over the balance between coordination and governance or centralized authority and institutional autonomy has been lengthy and intense, but there has been little experimentation with new forms of relationships. The introduction of collective bargaining certainly shifts the constellation of governance as it sharpens the definition and articulation of concerns of one group in the academic arena. Additionally, various volunteer arrangements have attempted to develop new alignments, some ad hoc and some for specialized purposes, such as consortia for international programs or for specialized graduate work. However, many of the above arrangements fall short of dealing with substantive changes in statutory alignments of institutions and their central authority.

The erosion of institutional freedom and the lack of substance in the temporal adjustments have prompted educators and politicians to launch a renewed search for new forms or variations of governance. The urgency of this probe is reflected in such statements as one offered by President Albert Brown in his "Models for Academic Change and Improvement".

> . . . Planning models must be sensitive to the tightening of resources, demands for accountability and a sense of personal and professional urgency. This denies any continuing luxury based on vastly decentralized

John A. Marvel is president of the Consortium of State Colleges in Colorado

> and accidental, undirected individual entrepreneurship. This is not to deny the need of creating and effecting involvement at the faculty level; it is to deny that institutions can accidentally exist as a sum of their uncoordinated parts and maintain a highly credible role in the future.[1]

The general awareness of such expressions clearly intensifies the search for new models of relationships. Short of the inauguration of more meaningful governing structures which demonstrate to constituents that higher education is capable of directing its own activities, there will be further loss of public confidence. Thus, as Earl Cheit has so aptly conveyed, pressures from centralized agencies are causing dangerous subtle amendments to the original ordinance of self-denial that states imposed upon themselves as they created education institutions free of the power of state influence. [2] The imminent threat of such a reality should cause all academicians and enlightened citizens to fashion the most functional relationships between their institutions and their political constituency.

Within the context that institutional autonomy is never experienced in its purest sense and that some form of centralized authority is a way of life, the trustees and institutional presidents of the State Colleges of Colorado examined the current structure to determine its responsiveness to social expectations and educational needs. The assessment dramatized the need for a functional relationship to blend central authority with institutional management. In response, a structure was created which combines the positive elements of a chancellorship and a board secretariat. This avoided a strong central staff with its tendencies to become an entity in itself; and, at the other extreme, a system so decentralized that institutions would have no sense of community for the purpose of combining strengths and resources.

The new organization was given official endorsement in August 1976, and was granted statutory authorization in June 1977, as the Consortium of State Colleges in Colorado. It is too early to judge the long-range implications of this concept. There are, however, indices of its initial impact.

Basically, the new form of governance is premised on a procedure which begins with the involvement of the faculties and administrators of all the colleges. This method permits faculty, students, administrators, and trustees of the Consortium to share in policy and program development and assessment. This shared authority and responsibility is based on two factors: one is the amenability of each institution to cooperate with and in the administrative structure; the other, the agreement of each institution to engage in evaluation on the basis of Consortium objectives determined through the management structure.

Specific Aspects of Consortium Governance

The governance format of the Consortium is based on a cabinet and four administrative councils, supplemented by a faculty council, a Consortium Com-

mittee, and special committees or task forces. Each of these has definite but wide parameters to function within the policies of the governing board. The process of the contemplated issues or activities must be processed through the councils and cabinet.

Each council is chaired by one of the four college presidents and is composed of representatives from all the colleges. These representatives include students, faculty, and administrators. The cabinet is composed of the four college presidents and is chaired by the president of the Consortium. All college presidents are hired and appointed as chief executives of their institutions and as members of the Consortium cabinet with expectations of exerting leadership at both levels. The cabinet is charged with the responsibility of forwarding its deliberations to the trustees and to all councils, from which the original issues or policies emanate. Changes in any of the council recommendations, if they are substantive, are returned to the council by the cabinet before the trustees are invited to act on such recommendations.

In the process and spirit of fostering institutional autonomy, long-range planning seminars are held annually to refine goals and objectives which are mutually beneficial to all institutions. Moreover, evaluation of institutional effectiveness is posited on the extent to which these agreed upon goals and objectives have been achieved collectively and individually by the Consortium colleges. It is in this latter instance that a significant new device is added to the governance process. Institutions, by this mode, agree to share resources in effecting maximized educational opportunities for students. To this end, goals and objectives of the Consortium become the compelling forces behind governance.

Regular meetings of the cabinet and councils serve to monitor the progress of Consortium objectives and institutional operations. These procedures have the virtue of providing "self-imposed" constraints, demands, and expectations of each institution. Subsequently, each institution is evaluated on the basis of goal achievement.

Consortium and Institutional Profiles

The Consortium is composed of four institutions.

Adams State College, located in Alamosa, provides the Consortium with broad programs at the undergraduate level in the arts, sciences, multinational studies, education, and business. At the graduate level, programs are provided in education, arts, and sciences. Emphasis on pre-healing arts, pre-law, environmental science, and journalism are curricular thrusts of the college.

Mesa College, located in Grand Junction, offers comprehensive undergraduate programs leading to baccalaureate degrees, associate degrees, and certificate programs. Major programs include general and specialized curricula in the arts, humanities, health, business, and behavioral, physical and biological sciences. Summer field work in environmental geoscience has attracted many Consortium students.

Metropolitan State College, located in Denver, is a comprehensive state institution providing effective urban-oriented programs through the baccalaureate degree

in liberal arts and sciences. Quality programs in applied and technical areas and in the professions also provide support for the diverse, commuter student population which exceeds 13,000.

Western State College, located in Gunnison, is a strong liberal arts college offering a broad baccalaureate program in the arts and sciences. A reputable professional program is provided in business and education. A variety of pre-professional programs also are available. Graduate level educational programs are provided to allow the student an opportunity for additional study in specialized areas.

The goal of the Consortium is to meet the educational needs of a diverse student population. The number of students served by Consortium schools exceeds 25,000. The majority of students come from lower and middle income economic backgrounds, and many are among the first in their families to seek a college degree. On the urban campuses particularly, the typical student is older than the average student found on other campuses. The student population served encompasses the entire state and more than 90 percent are residents of Colorado.

The educational goal of most students in trustee institutions is to achieve the academic qualifications required for productive employment in a chosen career, accompanied by desire for self-enhancement.

A basic liberal arts program designed to meet the general needs of students is offered on each of the four campuses and special institutional programs are available to all students through resource sharing. Undergraduate majors are offered in 89 disciplines, and 15 distinct graduate programs are available. The emphasis in the Consortium is on excellence of teaching and a close faculty-student relationship. The needs and welfare of the students are primary faculty concerns. The program is designed to take the student where he is educationally and enable him to reach his career and self-improvement goals.

Through a process of council and cabinet deliberations involving representatives from Consortium institutions, the trustees developed criteria and guidelines for evaluating academic programs of all institutions. Essentially, these guidelines apply to academic programs by assessing productivity of programs, cost-effectiveness of programs, resources utilized in programs, and marketability of graduates of these programs.

The latest effort of a real magnitude has been directed toward teacher education. However, programs in humanities, health occupations, general education, and some areas of vocational education are in line for review.

Programs which do not have high productivity and do not serve as core-offerings to the basic thrust of the college are usually diminished in size or eliminated. In most instances, resources are withdrawn from non-productive programs. These resources generally are redeployed elsewhere.

The 1978-79 operating budget for Consortium institutions exceeds $30 million. The per-student cost within the Consortium is $1,688. The total faculty and staff resources approximate 1,500, resulting in a general student/faculty ratio of 20/1.

The Trustees' Denver office has a small staff consisting of three professionals and three classified personnel.

Politically, socially, educationally, and geographically, the trustees represent the diversity of the State's population, including the wide range of professional, business, labor, and domestic endeavors of the employment marketplaces. These diverse backgrounds bring a richness to Board discourses that produces creative and novel approaches to governance in general. Outcomes of these co-acting situations in Board deliberations generate opportunities for good institutional autonomy through goal achievement and program accountability.

Accessibility to the trustees is also a product of this form of governance. Dispersed geographically, trustees are readily available for consultations and open discussions with their constituents throughout the state. To supplement this accessibility, Board meetings are convened on each campus twice a year to enhance contact with students and faculty.

Balance in Structure in Higher Education of Colorado

Lending a degree of credibility to the total organizational pattern of Consortium colleges is the fact that all of them uniformly fit the same institutional model described in the Carnegie classification. Carrying this step further, the current governance structure of higher education in Colorado generally arranges itself in similar institutional groupings. The four clusters of higher education which adhere to this are: Regents system of the University of Colorado; Board of Agriculture, system of Colorado State University; the Consortium of State Colleges; the Community Colleges, and finally, the two nationally known specialized institutions, the University of Northern Colorado and the Colorado School of Mines. The private institutions must be considered as another dimension which follows this classification in higher education.

The statutory provisions for the Consortium grant authorization to contract with other institutions and systems. Currently the Consortium has contracted with Colorado State University, Ft. Lewis College, University of Colorado, University of Northern Colorado, and the University of Southern Colorado for joint programs in social work education, rural development activities, teacher education programs, media specialists, and for drug and addictive education programs. The various systems are defensible in that each system is large enough to provide a critical mass of students and resources, small enough for the governing board to know each institution's needs, and diverse enough to provide budgetary and program flexibility to meet the unique needs of the students and communities served.

Meetings of the administrators within the higher education community via the Association of Public College and University Presidents and the Colorado Commission on Higher Education provide excellent platforms for exchanging experiences in such areas as formula budgeting, program development, and faculty enrichment.

Outcomes of Consortium Governance

A review of the first year of operation reveals some positive gains:

- 14 academic programs continue to be shared among Consortium institutions in professional education, business, social sciences, and fine arts;

- four Consortium-wide seminars were held for faculty from all basic disciplines resulting in plans for joint activities in the respective disciplines;

- faculty exchanges were implemented for short sessions in summer terms in fine arts, sciences, and education;

- a series of cultural arts programs also were shared.

Major programs for the current year include:

- program development in media specialists, industrial education, gerontology, allied health, nursing, and business;

- faculty conferences sponsored by each institution in the areas of humanities, fine arts, sciences, and social sciences;

- cooperative activities with the public schools in such areas as programs for talented students, career education, in-service education, and joint instructorships.

The above program accomplishments demonstrate that the Consortium of State Colleges has acted on the mandate of the legislature to maximize educational opportunities through the resource-sharing process. In addition to the activities listed, legislative-approved budget flexibility has afforded fiscal resource sharing in cash and general funds within the Consortium. To the consumers of higher education, this demonstrates that programs can be enhanced through faculty enrichment seminars and faculty exchange. To all constituents of Colorado, this process is cost effective in time, money, and physical resources. Principally, it means that lay governing boards can be accountable and responsive to the public and to the consumers they serve without admonitions and monitoring from stronger centralized authority agencies.

It also must be acknowledged that over the past year some testing took place between Consortium and institutional administrations on demands for budgetary resources. The cooperative posturing of the Consortium presented a change from historical competitive roles and sometimes was viewed as interfering with healthy competition. It also was apparent that immediate constituent demands were given primary attention and thus leadership energies for the Consortium programs were

somewhat diluted. Every Consortium method was viewed as direct reciprocity for all parties rather than for the total welfare of the Consortium. It also should be noted that many constituents accuse the Consortium of verbalizing more than performing. Admittedly, there are weaknesses, but as Harold Hodgkinson said:

> Participation in interinstitutional consortia will be the major factor in determining the survival of institutions in the next few years. Consortia offers the potential of lower cost and accentuates faculty renewal as well as a broader array of academic offerings. For institutions this may make the difference between survival and extinction. [3]

Summary

While experience may modify some aspects of the Consortium, it must remain flexible enough to nurture the spirit which built it. There is always danger of overemphasizing structural models. The only purpose of structure is to make organizationally possible that which is educationally sound. Neither institutional indifference nor centralized directives should be accommodated in an organizational structure.

Before the good ship "Collegiality" is decommissioned and placed into dry dock, those who believe that the academic community can keep afloat in collegial waters should be allowed and prepared to chart bold, definitive courses.

There are many routes to the objectives of effective governance, but a successful journey requires that all involved know for whence the sails are set.

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Restrictive Aspects of Centralized Governance

Albert N. Whiting

During the sixties, a period of unprecedented growth in American higher education, colleges and universities satisfactorily weathered serious and often violent challenges to their educational methods and philosophies; to their mechanisms of control and structures; to their methods of financing and accountability; and finally, to their management practices and planning for the future. As the militancy and criticism of that period waned, optimism began to surface about the opportunity to devote effort and interests again to educational concerns. However, the legacy of this period was a sharpened scrutiny of higher education which, partially in response to campus activism but also because of increasing budgetary worries, gave rise to reactive and even, possibly, retaliatory oversight trends.

These trends led to a tightening of control and a centralization of authority in public higher education, from singular campus to multi-campus systems, and from local governing boards to state-wide mechanisms. This movement has progressed most rapidly in recent years so that today no state is without some form of coordinating or planning or consolidating mechanism: 46 states have 1202 commissions; at least 70 percent of the public four-year campuses are no longer governed by their own individual boards.[1] The free-standing campus, uncoordinated, unregulated, and unconsolidated—once the prevalent model in this country—is now about non-existent in the public sector.[2]

Harold L. Enarson, president of Ohio State University, sounded, perhaps, the first national alarm in a 1973 issue of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* when he wrote:

> There is a tempting heresy loose in the land. Very simply, it is a dangerous notion that State Universities are simply another agency of State government, a unit to be policed, regulated and whipped into a bureaucratic mold. In this view, the University is simply a production unit in the knowledge industry, a kind of specialized factory processing human beings for strictly utilitarian ends.
>
> Make no mistake about it. In state after state, a managerial revolution is steadily underway. It threatens to convert relatively free-standing, self-directing institutions of higher learning into homogeneous state systems. The old faiths—academic freedom, institutional flexibility—are pushed aside. The new articles of faith are control, coordination, efficiency and something called "accountability".[3]

Albert N. Whiting is chancellor of North Carolina Central University

The obvious question is whether this is good or bad. Does this arrangement result in the more efficient use of resources? Does it improve educational programming? Are there improvements in the managerial process?

Based on five years of experience in a centralized system, the last question should be answered in the affirmative, especially with reference to budgeting and politics. In the North Carolina system, which is composed of 16 constituent institutions divided into Ph.D granting institutions, comprehensive universities, and baccalaureate institutions, there is now a more sensitive response to the budget requests of the smaller institutions, largely because educators are setting the priorities and formulating a unitary budget request for the legislature. This reduces political influence somewhat and operates to the advantage of the institutions that lack the political clout gained either through extensive alumni influence or overwhelming prestige. As a result, there are effects that reach constructively into programming, instruction, and capital improvements.

However, these quite beneficial by-products often are minimized by dissipating staff time to meet ever increasing bureaucratic requirements to satisfy what, at times, becomes procedural mystique and overkill. An illustration of this procedural morass is the complicated procedure required to handle appeals for residency classification. The process starts with the out-of-state student filing an application for in-state residency with the Registrar's Office, along with supporting data. If the Registrar denies the request, then what follows is a tedious process, to say the least. First, the student appeals to the chancellor who, in turn, refers the case usually to a campus residence committee. If the committee sustains the registrar's decision, then the student may notify the chancellor of his or her intent to appeal the committee's decision to the University System's residence appeal committee. This must be done with in a 10-day period, following which, the chancellor assembles all of the data submitted by the student into a record file. This file is submitted to the student for review and correction, if necessary. If no corrections or additions are required, then the student must indicate such in writing within 10 days and include, either in the same letter or in a subsequent letter, a formal statement of appeal. This is reviewed by an officer at the University System Central Office who, in turn, sends a letter to the chancellor approving acceptance of the record file for purposes of appeal, after which a formal hearing is authorized. The time consumed by this procedure can range from three to 12 months. One must pity the student and sympathize with those who, amidst myriad other duties, must follow carefully the steps of the procedure. This is a matter which could be handled by the institution's Board of Trustees, but for reasons unknown, the Boards are overlooked completely.

In a conference devoted to dangers to the foundations of higher education, one participant commented:

> I am convinced egalitarianism depends not solely on access but much more on diversity. I think we need multiple pyramids of prestige, both in the job market, in society generally, and among our institutions. I am

> increasingly skeptical the more I see of the large, multi-campus system, particularly like the University of Wisconsin or North Carolina, with all different types of institutions put together in a system where there is bound to be a prestige relationship, a hierarchy. We ought to be skeptical of single standards of merit.[4]

One of the major debates today regarding American higher education relates to quality. This, of course, may well be an endless inquiry. Nevertheless, changes in structure and instructional approach always are examined to determine contribution or lack of contribution to quality. Therefore, the question should be asked, what has centralization added to this dimension? Although data are not yet sufficient to reach a definite conclusion, there are a number of harbingers which portend difficulties relative to quality. Faculties, for example, are beginning to manifest a rather vague uneasiness about long distance planning and decision-making with reference to eliminating courses and programs. Such uneasiness and its associated insecurity, particularly if cutbacks relate to enrollment, leads inevitably to efforts to popularize courses and programs, unbecoming proselytism, and eventually, reduction in quality.

Furthermore, the rather popular centralized five-year planning model used by many higher educational systems tends to tunnelize vision and restrict creativity and flexibility. The plan becomes the focus rather than education. Obviously, this can be avoided, but only with great and uncommon effort. The effect on quality needs no elaboration.

It also should be noted that the tendency in a number of systems to evaluate and to eliminate courses and programs on the basis of "productivity" equates education with a "balance sheet—bottom line" mentality ill-suited to the individualism of learning and the long-range multiplier effect. In addition, the productivity test completely ignores the concept of faculty autonomy in curriculum matters, a value long supported in higher education, and allows a statistical judgment to be substituted for the collective judgment of the faculty. With such an approach, one can visualize curricula with splendid statistical balance but devoid of well-rounded educational choice expected in a comprehensive university.*

Perhaps the most dramatic restriction arising from centralization in governance relates to the circumstances under which campus executives (i.e., chancellors and/or presidents) must operate. While the following description may not be true of all systems, it is sufficiently wide-spread to be a matter of genuine concern. Briefly, the dilemma arises from a condition in which leadership is expected and imperative but is attenuated and occasionally abrogated by the central administration. Even in situations where attenuation and abrogation are not a matter of record, if the

*In all fairness, however, it should be noted that most systems permit some redress where special justifications are presented, but nevertheless, there is still a press towards formula decisions in this area based on productivity.

governing documents provide the authority for such, there is a kind of psychological debilitation of campus executives. For example, in systems where appointment of major administrative officers below the level of chancellor or president must be sent to the central administration and governing board for final approval, the potential veto of the campus executive's selection creates an attitude of resentment. The same would apply to promotion, tenure, and salary recommendations. In some systems, these items must be presented to a personnel committee of the governing board composed primarily of lay people only remotely acquainted with the campuses and rarely familiar with the personnel involved. Under these circumstances, such requirements seem ill-founded. Even more to the point, the procedure slows down decision-making. It reduces flexibility in the handling of crisis situations and makes it almost impossible for recruiting commitments to be made with promptness in highly competitive situations. Yet, the campus executive is expected to build a first-rate administrative staff and to recruit top faculty. Failure to achieve this becomes an evaluative discredit despite the many hindrances.

In a number of systems the campus chief executive is not permitted by system policy to deal directly either with state legislative committees or individual legislators during legislative sessions. This function is reserved for the system head, with the assistance of the campus executives when requested. The needs of the individual institutions officially stand in the record as they are recognized and interpreted by the central administration spokesmen. Advocacy or amendment of that record to correct misinterpretations by a campus executive may be attempted at the peril of reprimand, disfacor, or disciplinary actions. This kind of "muzzling" is not only an administrative irritant but a serious restriction on the flow of information necessary for truly informed legislative action. (It may even be a violation of constitutional rights.)

Finally, in situations where local boards of trustees exist and derive power by delegation from the central governing boards, the cards are stacked against the trustees. Most governing boards and central systems are not inclined to give away any substantive powers. Therefore, the trustees are forced to operate in an interstitial zone of such minimal consequence that their existence as a lower level governance entity contributes almost nothing to the process. Of course, boards with forceful and informed leadership occasionally may break out of this zone, but the structural press is in the other direction.

The foregoing evaluation of multi-campus centralized governance is, perhaps, best summarized in the commentary of The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching:

> We note. . .the overall tendency toward centralization of authority over higher education. . . .We regret this because:
>
> 1. It reduces the influence of students and faculty members and of campus administrators and of members of campus governing boards—all persons who

know the most about institutions of higher education and are the most directly involved in their operations. It also reduces their sense of responsibility. The governance of academic institutions should include an influential role for academics and for those in close relations with them.

2. This centralization seems to have had no measurable direct impacts on policies or on practices. No provable cause can thus far be made that higher education is in any way better because of centralization, except where it has taken place in the one area of careful advance academic planning for higher education as a whole.

It is, of course, not possible to know, however, what would have happened in the absence of the centralization that did occur.

3. The governance processes are worse. They are more costly, more cumbersome, more time-consuming, more frustrating and place more power in the hands of those who are the furthest removed and who know the least.[5]

The foregoing is not meant to imply that public higher education should be allowed to proceed without restraints. In fact, it is already subject to a number of quite effective restraints, such as the state budget, the student market, the rising body of educational law, and the judgment of private donors. Perhaps there is need for long-range planning mechanisms, but there is no need for the detailed regulation and governance which has emerged and which is handcuffing American public higher education.

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